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Since the end of the civil war in 1995, the United States and the world community 
have poured enormous amounts of money and resources into Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in an attempt to create a sustainable peace for all of Bosnias citizens based on the 
principles of democratic governance.  But at times, it seems that, although the 
fighting has stopped, the country is no closer to being a functioning, stable democracy 
than it was when the multi-national intervention force first arrived more than five 
years ago.  This thesis examines democracy theory and the democratization process to 
provide an explanation for why the international effort has been unsuccessful so far, 
and explores alternative ways to address some of those shortcomings.   This thesis 
argues that the Stabilization Force (SFOR) has the ability to be a more effective 
partner in fostering consolidated democracy in Bosnia.  It concludes by identifying 
military capabilities such as civil affairs, Special Forces and intelligence collection 
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Since the end of the civil war in 1995, the United States and the world community 
have poured money and resources into Bosnia and Herzegovina in an attempt to create a 
sustainable peace for all of Bosnias citizens based on the principles of democratic 
governance.  But at times, it seems that although the fighting has stopped the country is 
no closer to being a functioning, stable democracy than it was when the multi-national 
intervention force first arrived more than five years ago.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
identify some of the reasons the goal of establishing a multi-ethnic and democratic state 
in Bosnia continues to elude the international community, and to explain how the 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) can more effectively support that goal.   
Clearly, maintaining a secure environment in which civilian implementation can 
occur is and should remain the primary mission of the military in Bosnia.  Responsibility 
for civilian implementation rightly belongs to civilian institutions, such as the United 
Nations (UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and 
other governmental and non-governmental organizations.  But the notion that the military 
is either unable toor should notmeaningfully contribute to building a positive peace 
within a democratic framework is mistaken and ultimately self-defeating.   
 This thesis argues that the military has the ability to be a more effective partner in 
that effort than it is now, based on an examination of the requirements of the desired end-
state and an analysis of how and why the current situation falls short of that ideal.  It 
concludes by identifying military capabilities that could directly contribute to addressing 
x 
those needs.  Specifically, SFOR can make substantial and unique contributions to 
strengthening respect for the rule of law; enhancing the commitment of both elites and 
masses to democracy; and increasing the legitimacy of the government of Bosnia in the 
eyes of its citizens through military reform. 
Creating a democratic, peaceful state out of the two entities and three peoples of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is an ambitious, costly and noble project.  Failing in that project 
would have negative consequences for Americas position as world leader and also for 
European security.  But it could also have catastrophic consequences for the people of 
Bosnia.  For all these reasons, the challenge of consolidating democracy in Bosnia 
deserves and requires the fullest and most effective use of all available resources, 
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Since the end of the civil war in 1995, the United States and the world community 
have poured money and resources into Bosnia and Herzegovina in an attempt to create a 
sustainable peace for all of Bosnias citizens based on the principles of democratic 
governance.  But at times, it seems that although the fighting has stopped the country is 
no closer to being a functioning, stable democracy than it was when the multi-national 
intervention force first arrived more than five years ago.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine why the goal of establishing a multi-ethnic and democratic state in Bosnia 
continues to elude the international community, and to explain how the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) can more effectively support that goal.   
Clearly, maintaining a secure environment in which civilian implementation can 
occur is and should remain SFORs primary mission in Bosnia.  Responsibility for 
civilian implementation rightly belongs to civilian institutions, such as the United Nations 
(UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other 
governmental and non-governmental organizations.  But the notion that the military is 
either unable toor should notmeaningfully contribute to building a positive peace 
within a democratic framework is mistaken and ultimately self-defeating.   
In point of fact, there are a variety of ways in which the military can support 
democratization efforts, specifically developing respect for the rule of law; enhancing the 
commitment of both elites and masses to democracy; and strengthening the legitimacy of 
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the government through military reform.  This may require a change in attitude toward 
nation-building on the part of the US political and military establishments, but it would 
also hasten the day when SFOR can declare its mission accomplished and go home.    
A. BACKGROUND 
 In the days and weeks preceding the November 12, 2000 general elections in 
Bosnia, the international community hoped that voters would reject the nationalist parties 
that had dominated Bosniac, Croat and Serb politics throughout the civil war of 1992-95 
and even after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.  To break this hold, the 
international community invested considerable effort, as well as billions of dollars, over 
five years to reconstruct the country and encourage democratization and reconciliation.  
Quite understandably, the donors wanted to see a return on their investment. 
Furthermore, there were signs that nationalism was on the wane in the region as a 
whole: Alija Izetbegovics retirement as the Bosniac member of the rotating presidency 
in Bosnia and Hercegovina and the poor showing of his Muslim Party for Democratic 
Action (SDA) in the April local elections were such indicators. Another was the death 
from cancer of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and the subsequent resounding defeat 
of his HDZ at the polls.  Most surprising, and perhaps also most welcome, was Slobodan 
Milosevics loss to Vojislav Kostunica in the October presidential race in the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia.  
 Unfortunately, as election results filtered in, it became apparent that no such 
change would occur in Bosnia.  The nationalist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), founded 
by indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, won a decisive victory in the race for the 
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Bosnian Serb Republic presidency.  The SDS also emerged as the strongest party in the 
elections for the Bosnian Serb assembly as well as for the Republics representatives to 
the national legislature.  In the Muslim-Croat Federation, the picture was mixed, with the 
nationalist SDA and the multiethnic, reform-oriented Social Democratic Party each 
gaining roughly 27 percent of the votes, but the Croatian Democratic Union dominated 
among ethnic Croats and finished with 19 percent of the Federations total votes.  Once 
again, Bosnians had turned to nationalist leaders at the polls. 
Admittedly, as American Ambassador to Bosnia Thomas Miller pointed out to the 
New York Times, as recently as 1996 all three nationalist parties had received more than 
70 percent of the vote in their areas.  Now, although they remained dominant, neither the 
Bosnian Croat HDZ, the Bosnian Serb SDS, nor the Muslim SDA had a majority in any 
assembly.  Nevertheless, the results are mixed and promise a future of power sharing 
and haggling that spell further ineffectual government and continued obstruction from 
nationalists of efforts at unifying the country.1   
Consequently, this failure unequivocally to embrace democracy makes it unlikely 
that the NATO-led Stabilization Force will be able to pull out of Bosnia any time soon.  
Carl Bildt, currently Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General to the 
Balkans and formerly the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, predicted in 
the January/February 2001 issue of Foreign Affairs that, if troops were withdrawn today 
. . . a new war would break out tomorrow.  Self-sustaining regional stability remains a 
                                                 
1 Carlotta Gall, Bosnian Election Returns Point to Little Change, Analysts Say, New York Times, 
November 20, 2000. A10. 
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good distance away.2  But if the international presence in Bosniaincluding the troop 
deployments, civilian organizations and substantial financial commitmentsis not to be 
open-ended, all participants must become more effective in their mission of creating a 
self-sustaining, multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia Herzegovina. 
 Based on an examination of the requirements of the desired end-state and an 
analysis of why the current situation falls short, this thesis argues that SFOR has the 
ability to be a more effective partner in the democratization effort.  Finally, it concludes 
by identifying military capabilities that could be applied to meeting those requirements.  
Creating a democratic, peaceful state out of the two entities and three peoples of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is an ambitious, costly and worthy project.  Failing in that project will 
have negative consequences for Americas position as world leader and for the future of 
European security.  But it could also have catastrophic consequences for the people of 
Bosnia.  For all these reasons, the challenge of consolidating democracy in Bosnia 
deserves and requires the fullest and most effective use of all available resources, 
including the active participation by SFOR in the work of democratization. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis is based on an analytical survey of primary and secondary sources 
relating to: democracy theory and the democratization process as practiced by the United 
States; the specific challenges to democratization presented by post-conflict societies; the 
international communitys post-war involvement in Bosnia; and past American military 
                                                 
2 Carl Bildt, The Balkans Second Chance, Foreign Affairs, vol. 80 no. 1,   January/February 2001. 
149. 
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experiences with democratization and nation-building.  Sources include books by policy-
makers such as Richard Holbrooke and Ivo Daalder, testimony before government 
committees and analyses of the militarys performance in Bosnia.  Interviews were also 
conducted with individuals involved in both civilian and military aspects of 
implementation or who have had experience doing similar work in other countries.   
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 This thesis analyzes the requirements of democratic government and identifies the 
unique contributions the military can make in pursuit of the national strategic objective of 
building a self-sustaining democracy in Bosnia Herzegovina.  Chapter II examines the 
mission objective of SFOR and the international community by describing the elements 
of consolidated democracy, paying close attention to those areas the military is best able 
to influence.  It also briefly outlines the process of democratization, looking first at the 
phases of conflict suppression operations as defined by General George A. Joulwan and 
Christopher C. Shoemaker and then at what Thomas Carothers calls the core strategy of 
American democracy promoters.   
Chapter III is an overview and a critique of the current civilian and military 
implementation effort in Bosnia, based in part on the shortcomings of the American 
approach to democratization as described by Thomas Carothers.  Chapter IV describes 
how SFOR could more effectively support democratization by drawing on past American 



























II. DEFINING THE END-STATE  
 
The national policy objective of the United States in Bosnia is the construction 
of a multi-ethnic, democratic, and prosperous state.3  The purpose of this chapter is to 
describe the desired end-state and the path being taken to it.  It begins by explaining what 
a democracy is and what conditions allow a democracy to endure.  Then it looks at the 
phases of a conflict suppression operation, to understand where democratization fits into 
the overall mission of ending a conflict and providing for a sustainable peace.  Lastly, it 
examines the democratization process itself.  Understanding the theories behind the 
mission in Bosnia is necessary to providing useful suggestions for improvement.   
A. WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? 
Writers on the subject of democracy and democratization frequently do not agree 
on what, precisely, the term democracy means.  Samuel P. Huntington, for example, 
makes fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes 
and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote the central tenet of 
democracy in his study of democratization in the late twentieth century.4  Although he 
shies away from identifying any sociopolitical elements of democracywhat he calls 
sweeping and idealistic connotationsto go along with elections, Huntington does 
                                                 
3 Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of Americas Bosnia Policy (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 144-5. 
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (London: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 7. 
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concede that his definition implies the existence of the political and civic freedoms 
needed to make an election truly free and contested.5   
But because the goal of United States policy in Bosnia is the establishment of a 
self-sustaining democracy, this thesis will use a broader definition of democracy that 
combines the procedural elements of Huntingtons definition with the social aspects of 
what Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan all call consolidated democracy.  
Democratic consolidation is the deep, unquestioned, routinized commitment to 
democracy and its procedures at the elite and mass levelsor, more briefly, it is when 
democracy becomes the only game in town.6 
In their discussion of the problems of democratic transition and consolidation, 
Linz and Stepan identify five characteristics of society that must be present in what they 
assume is an already functioning state before democracy can be consolidated.   
First, the conditions must exist for the development of a 
free and lively civil society.  Second, there must be a 
relatively autonomous political society.  Third, throughout 
the territory of the state all major political actors, especially 
the government and the state apparatus, must be effectively 
subjected to a rule of law that protects individual freedoms 
and associational life.  Fourth, there must be a state 
bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic 
government.  Fifth, there must be an institutionalized 
economic society.7 
 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), 65. 
9 
 Civil society is predicated upon the idea of a participatory citizenry.  It includes 
the voluntary organizations, such as labor unions, womens and students groups, 
business and civic organizations, and other community associations formed for such 
purposes as lobbying, acting as watchdogs, or educating the public about political issues 
or rights.  It reinforces democracy by standing between the government and the 
individual, and by involving citizens acting collectively to promote public interests and to 
hold government accountable.  Simultaneously, it helps to limit the power of government 
and promote the rule of law.8  An autonomous political society is composed of political 
parties and the institutions of government, in which separation of powers, horizontal and 
vertical accountability and civilian control over the military must be entrenched.9 
 Rule of law is commonly viewed as one of the most fundamental elements of a 
democracy.10  A society-wide commitment to the rule of law requires adherence to a 
constitution, an independent judiciary, the perception that the law applies equally to all 
actors and respect for human rights, as well as the subordination of government power to 
legal authority.11  SFOR, in its SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment 
with Respect for the Rule of Law, defines it as a process by which conflicting interests 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Larry Diamond, ed., Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 17. 
8 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 221. 
9 Diamond, Themes and Perspectives, p. 17-8 and Diamond, Developing Democracy, 34-5. 
10 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 164. 
11 Ibid. and Diamond, Themes and Perspectives, 18-20 and Diamond, Developing Democracy, 42. 
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are aired, mediated, regulated, and resolved in a non-violent fashion through 
governmental institutions  that are accountable to the public.12   
In societies transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, 
developing a respect for the rule of law may also require a drastic change in the 
relationship of the police and the military to the citizenry.  The military, internal security 
forces and police may have had a predatory attitude toward civilians, as in Haiti, or they 
may have regarded their primary mission to be one of supporting regime stability, as 
under the Communist government of the former Yugoslavia.  In either case, their mission 
must become one of protecting and serving the civilian population.13  A foreign military 
intervention force can play a significant role in fostering the necessary democratic and 
professional reforms within the host nation military. 
But respect for the rule of law also goes beyond institutions and legislation to 
govern relationships between individuals and between individuals and institutions in 
accordance with norms and values that must be internalized in a society.14  As will be 
seen in Chapter IV, this is another area in which the military, through its ability to affect 
public security and using its intelligence collection capabilities to target organized crime 
and corruption, is well able to support the democratization process. 
                                                 
12 SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment with Respect for the Rule of Law. [Final 
draft sent to General Meigs 14 March 2000], x. 
13 Robert Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic and Elliot M. Goldberg, eds., Policing the New World 
Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 
1998), 216 and 263. 
14 Carothers, 165. 
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A usable bureaucracy simply but importantly refers to the means by which the 
state collects taxes, provides services, and monopolizes violence on its territory.15  A 
bureaucracy is ultimately dependent on the successful development of an economic 
society, which Linz and Stepan define as the laws and regulations that mediate between 
the government and the market.  In a democracy, this most often means developing a 
market economy in order to provide citizens with the economic independence that will 
allow them to assert their political independence from the government.16   
The economy is even more important in a post-conflict environment, though, for 
two reasons.  The first is the role the economy can play in exacerbating or mitigating 
ethnic conflict.  Economic prosperity typically breeds contentment and stability, and is 
usually also accompanied by the high levels of urbanization, literacy and education that 
favor democratization.  Increased wealth also means more resources can be distributed to 
ease tensions.17  Economic difficulties, however, are frequently cited as a primary cause 
of ethnic conflict because they can lead to increased competition for resources.18   
Second, a growing economy can help bridge differences between groups.  This is 
because a prosperous, integrated economy can serve as an arena in which former 
                                                 
15 Diamond, Themes and Perspectives, 20. 
16 Ibid., 21. 
17 Georg Sorenson, Democracy and Democratization Processes and Prospects in a Changing World,  
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 25-6. 
18 Jurg Helbling, Ted Robert Gurr, and Stuart J. Kaufman all refer to the role of economics as a contributing 
factor in their models of ethnic conflict. 
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opponents can come together to find common ground.19  According to the pluralist view 
of conflict management, interaction among ethnic groups through economic, political and 
other institutions can also transform those relations because parties will recognize the 
benefits to be gained from cooperation.20   
 Linz and Stepan do not include a supportive political culture in their list of 
characteristics that define a consolidated democracy, but Diamond believes it is important 
enough to merit an entire chapter of its own in his book Developing Democracy: Toward 
Consolidation.  Tracing the theory of political culture back to Aristotle, Diamond says 
that the characteristics of moderation, accommodation, cooperation and bargaining
rooted in trust, tolerance, participation and mutual respectare key elements in 
democratic political culture because of the role they play in enabling a society to balance 
conflict with the need for consensus.21 
But the trauma and suffering that have been inflicted upon a society which has 
only recently emerged from conflict pose significant challenges to the development of a 
political culture supportive of democracy, particularly with respect to trust.  
Interpersonal trust, as Diamond says, may seem tangential to the stability of 
democracy, but without it, the habit of resolving conflicts through institutional 
mechanisms rather than force is less likely to emerge, as are the willingness to 
                                                 
19 Sorenson, 21. 
20 Barnett R. Rubin, ed., Cases and Strategies for Preventive Action (New York: The Century 
Foundation Press, 1998), 30. 
21 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 20 and 165. 
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compromise and to respect others views which Diamond believes are necessary elements 
of democratic political culture.22  A lack of trust in ones political opponents, who may 
have also been on the opposing side during a war, can make the transition from bullets to 
ballots extremely difficult. 
Lastly, a stable democracy requires a faith in the legitimacy of democracy.  This 
faith must be held at both the elite and mass levels of society and in two dimensions: as 
an abstract principle as well as in the particular.  The people must not only believe that 
democracy the best form of government possible, but also that democracy is the most 
suitable form of government for their country at the present time.   
A regimes legitimacy as a democratic government is derived in large part from 
its ability to put democratic principles into practice.   
Regime performance is assessed in terms not only of 
economic growth and social reform but also several crucial 
political dimensions: the capacity to maintain order, to 
govern transparently, to maintain a rule of law [particularly 
with regard to human rights], and to otherwise respect and 
preserve the democratic rules of the game.23   
A second source of legitimacy, though, seems to be personal experience with democracy, 
which makes a participatory ethic and a vibrant civil society doubly important.24 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 207. 
23 Ibid., 170-1. 
24 Ibid., 170. 
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B. DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS 
The preceding section has outlined the necessary components of a stable 
democracy and some of the specific challenges faced by post-conflict societies making a 
transition to democracy.  This section will examine the process by which the United 
States government and aid providers seek first to end a conflict and then to encourage the 
adoption of democratic institutions and attitudes in a country such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.   
1. Phases of a Conflict Suppression Operation 
A commitment to making a democratic transition is frequently one element of a 
negotiated settlement to end a conflict.  For this transition to be successful, though, it 
must be part of a larger process that includes bringing an end to the violence, restoring 
order and rebuilding the institutions, infrastructure and trust that are essential elements of 
a stable political society.  When the international community assists in this 
transformation, it is taking part in a conflict suppression operation, because the operation 
encompasses both the immediate task of halting the fighting as well as the long-term goal 
of establishing political structures that prevent future fighting and instead promote non-
violent conflict resolution.   
General George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker provide a detailed 
framework for such an operation in their report to the Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict.  They divide the operation into three phases, each with a 
distinct purpose and a set of corresponding tasks.  This is a useful way to conceive of the 
15 
process because it describes how the focus of the intervention force and the emphasis on 
its civilian and military components change over time.   
Obviously the first step is to end the fighting, and this, dubbed the transformation 
phase, is primarily the responsibility of the intervening military.  Military tasks include 
separating the warring parties, maintaining peace and security, enforcing arms 
embargoes, disarmament and demobilization.  The military and some non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) specializing in emergency relief also assist in restoring basic 
services and providing humanitarian assistance.  Therefore, the primary thrust in the 
beginning of this phase is for military or internal security forces to create a secure 
environment and ensure freedom of movement while longer-term civilian functions are 
set in motion.25 
During the second, or stabilization, phase, the emphasis shifts from military to 
civilian initiatives.  At this stage, the cease-fire is in place and security has been restored, 
so the international community turns its attention to laying the foundations for an 
enduring peace.26  This can include restructuring and retraining the indigenous military 
and police, restarting the economy, rebuilding or reforming political institutions and re-
establishing education and health services.27   
                                                 
25 George A. Joulwan and Christopher C. Shoemaker, Civilian-Military Cooperation in the Prevention 
of Deadly Conflict, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, December, 1998), 12-3. 
26 Ibid., 3. 
27 Ibid., 14. 
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A military presence is still necessary during this phase, but Joulwan and 
Shoemaker are adamant in their assertion that other than maintaining internal security, 
the military has only a limited role to play in stabilization:  
[T]he daunting challenges of building the kinds of 
institutions and processes that  are at the heart of conflict 
prevention are far beyond the capabilities of any military.  
The military can bring about an absence of war; the 
military cannot bring about an enduring peace.28  
 
The underlying argument of this thesis takes issue with that last statement.  The 
military may be the only organization that can bring about an absence of war, and as the 
focus of international intervention shifts from transformation to stabilization, the burden 
of responsibility should rightly shift from the military to the civilian component as well.  
However, the military can make tremendously positive contributions toward the 
development of democratic practices and enduring peace, as will be demonstrated in 
Chapter IV.  Meanwhile, when the military is limitedor limits itselfto merely 
providing security, it necessarily delays the day when the international community can 
turn to the third and final phase of conflict suppression: normalization.  It is during this 
last phase that responsibility for government is turned over to local institutions and the 
international community withdraws.29 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 36. 
29 Ibid., 14-5. 
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2. The Democratization Template 
Joulwan and Shoemaker limit themselves to an extremely broad overview of what 
the elements of the democratization process are.  In fact, all they really say about process 
is that it involves building political institutions.  In contrast, American promoters of 
democratization abroad have developed a framework that describes how to accomplish 
democratization.   
Thomas Carothers, Vice President for Global Policy at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, explains in Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, 
what this framework, or core strategy is.   
The pattern, or template, as Carothers calls it, is derived from three sources: the 
American model of democracy, a belief about the natural sequencing of democratization 
and the concept of institutional modeling.  The first and second components have been 
modified somewhat in recent years to accommodate different approaches to democracy 
and different trajectories to transition, but continue to offer a democratization template 
that leads US democracy promoters to concentrate initially on elections and then to shift 
their attention to a mix of top-down institutional reform and bottom-up civil society 
strengthening approaches. 30    
                                                 
30 Carothers, 86-90, 95, 109 and 120.  This preference for early elections can be a potential pitfall for 
countries emerging from ethnic conflict.  Elections are frequently a primary focus of American democracy 
aid because free and fair elections are seen as a central component of democracy; because they are highly 
visible events with an obvious endpoint that appeal to organizations desirous of a short time commitment 
with a clear exit strategy; and because the transitioning countries themselves often embrace them as 
tangible evidence of their own break with the past. (Carothers, p. 124)  They may also be required as part of 
a negotiated settlement to end a war. 
This rush to hold elections, though, raises the question of when exactly it is appropriate for a 
country in transition to hold elections.  The issue becomes particularly important in a post-conflict 
18 
The third component in the American democracy promoters model, the 
institutional model, is perhaps the most optimistic and remains the most conceptually 
flawed.  In this view, if a society can reproduce the institutional components of 
established Western democracies, it will achieve democracy.  The process of 
transforming institutions is seen as the process of democratization itself.31   
This, says Carothers, is because American democracy promoters follow a 
commonsense approach of comparing sociopolitical institutions in their own country with 
those in the transitioning country, and propose projects to bring the latter in line with the 
former.  They also know more about living in a democratic society than they do about 
living in a transitioning one, which reinforces their tendency to focus on endpoints rather 
than process and on institutions rather than culture.32  The result is an approach that does 
not address the cultural and attitudinal qualities that make democracy possible and thus 
tends to ignore the strong interests that some elites may have in maintaining the status 
quo. 
Carothers summary of American efforts at judicial reform highlights this 
oversight: 
                                                                                                                                                 
environment.  Susan L. Woodward argues that in Bosnia, rather than representing a milestone on the way to 
self-sustaining democratic governance, this pivotal role of elections has had the opposite effect: making 
the international presence more necessary and without an end in sight (Steven M. Ruskin, ed., Three 
Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research and Field Projects 
Peaceworks 32 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, December 1999), 7.    
Other than acknowledging the existence of this dilemma, however, this thesis will not address the 
problem. 
 
31 Ibid., 90. 
32 Ibid., 92. 
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U.S. aid providers responding to the lack of formal justice 
in a country assess the judicial system, for example, and 
conclude that it falls short because cases move too slowly, 
judges are poorly trained and lack up-to-date materials, the 
infrastructure is woefully inadequate, and so on.  The aid 
providers then prescribe remedies on this basis: reform of 
court administration, training and legal materials for 
judges, equipment for courtrooms, and the like.  What they 
tend not to ask is why the judiciary is in a lamentable state, 
whose interests its weakness serves, and whose interests 
would be threatened or bolstered by reforms.33 
 
Because of the frequent failure of the top-down, institutional approach and given 
the role civil society played in the transitions of Poland and Czechoslovakia, aid 
providers have revised their strategy in recent years to include a bottom-up, grass-roots 
campaign as well.  Some theorists, however, such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Robert 
Putnam, would argue that the civil society strengthening approach is what should have 
been used to begin with.  They believe that the emphasis on institutions is misplaced, and 
that it is primarily cultural factors that determine outcomes.  
They propose that the establishment of stable democratic systems depends first on 
the existence of a strong civil society and civic culture.  For example, Daniel N. Nelson, 
in his essay Civil Society Endangered, suggests that, the linchpin of democratic 
change is unquestionably an enlarged participation and a heightened role for the 
populace, developing citizenship where previously the population was confined to the 
role of subjects.34   
                                                 
33 Ibid., 101. 
34 Richard Sakwa, ed., The Experience of Democratization in Eastern Europe: Selected Papers from 
the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995 (New York: St. Martins 
Press, Inc., 1999), 132. 
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In the case of judicial reform, for example, the new emphasis on a civil society, 
bottom-up approach means more aid money is reaching organizations that help people to 
assert their rights.  These include law-oriented NGOs that do legal advocacy for specific 
groups of citizens such as farmers or indigenous peoples, programs to stimulate public 
interest in law reforms and legal aid clinics that provide poor or disadvantaged people 
with access to the legal system.35   
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the elements of a consolidated democracy and also the 
theoretical sequence of events when the United States decides to intervene in a conflict 
and establish a democratic government as part of an integrated, civil-military response to 
the need for enduring peace.  As Joulwan and Shoemaker explain, the first step is conflict 
transformation, and this is primarily the responsibility of the military.   
During the second step, the stabilization phase, civilian organizations work to 
encourage the development of democratic institutions and practices in accordance with 
the core strategy outlined by Carothers.  This core strategy, through a mix of electoral 
and top-down, institutional reforms, attempts to enshrine the principles of democratic 
government in the country in question.  The growing recognition of the role civic culture 
plays in a transition has led to an increase in bottom-up, civil society reform as well.   
Democracy theorists, including Diamond, Huntington Linz and Stepan provided 
an understanding of what those elements are: frequent and fair elections, a vibrant civil 
                                                 
35 Carothers, 168-9. 
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society, an autonomous political society, respect for the rule of law, a usable bureaucracy, 
a market-oriented economic society, a supportive civic culture and, lastly, a belief in the 
legitimacy of democracy.   
The next chapter will describe how the international community is putting this 
process into practice in Bosnia, following the intervention to end the 1992-95 civil war.  
It will also highlight how the flaws inherent in the institutional model of democratization 
have been incorporated into the civilian implementation effort, to the detriment of the 
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III. BUILDING PEACE IN BOSNIA 
 
This chapter will describe the international military and civilian implementation 
efforts in Bosnia, using Joulwan and Shoemakers model of a conflict suppression 
mission as a framework.  In doing so, the chapter will show that the stabilization phase, 
as it is being carried out now, suffers from some of the conceptual problems exposed by 
Carothers and why these problems need to be addressed.  Chapter IV will then outline 
some ways SFOR could respond to these challenges.   
A. BACKGROUND 
 The civil war in Bosnia lasted from March 1992 to October 1995.  It pitted the 
Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs against each other, the latter two sides supported in 
varying degrees by their ethnic brethren in Croatia and Serbia proper.36  After the failure 
of a series of international initiatives to end the fighting, the combined pressure of air 
strikes by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Croatian ground 
offensive set the stage for all parties to participate in a peace conference in Dayton 
beginning November 1.  Three weeks later, after intense negotiations led by White House 
Special Envoy to Bosnia Richard Holbrooke, the parties initialed the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and, representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and 
                                                 
36 The Bosniacs also received support from other countries, particularly Islamic nations like Iran.  The 
support was mostly in the form of weapons, but small numbers of mujahideen did join the fight as well.  
Nevertheless, it is the opinion of the author that this support was qualitatively and quantitatively 
significantly different from that received by the Bosnian Croats and Serbs from Croatia and Serbia. 
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Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed the 
document in Paris on December 14, 1995.   
 By this time, however, the conflict had devastated Bosnia Herzegovina.  The war 
had led to atrocities on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II, mostly committed 
by the Bosnian Serbs against the Bosnian Muslims.37  It left over 250,000 civilians dead 
and 200,000 wounded, once again mostly Bosnian Muslims, and created more than one 
million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 1.1 million refugees who left Bosnia for 
other regions of the former Yugoslavia, and an additional 700,000 who left the Balkans 
entirely.38  
The Bosnian economy also suffered catastrophic loss: Per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) had fallen from $2,710 in 1991 to $250 in 1994; the countrys 
infrastructure and industry was in ruins; and estimates for reconstruction ranged from the 
                                                 
37 All sides were guilty of some atrocities, as war crimes indictments against members of all three 
factions indicate.  But the crimes committed on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs occurred on an entirely 
different scale.  See David Rieffs Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West and Mark Danners 
articles in The New York Review of Books, especially Bosnia: The Turning Point (February 5, 1998) and 
Operation Storm (October 22, 1998) for accounts of Bosnian Croat war crimes.  Chuck Sudetics Blood 
and Vengeance: One Familys Story of the War in Bosnia offers an excellent and notably even-handed 
account of the fall of Srebrenica 
38 Karin von Hippel, Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 140 and 165. 
The figures for casualties are disputed.  Von Hippel uses 250,000, which is the number General 
Charles Boyd, USAF (ret), who served as the Deputy Commander in Chief of the US European Command 
from November, 1992 to July 1995, says is the number the Bosniac government was claiming until April 
1995, when the government revised its estimate to 145,000.  Senate Hearing 104-855 offered the number 
200,000 but General Boyd believes the number to be closer to the 70,000-100,000 range.  (Charles Boyd, 
Making Peace with the Guilty, Foreign Affairs vol. 74 no. 5. September/October 1995, p. 27) 
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$5 billion figure given by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IDRB or World Bank) to the $43 billion sought by the Bosnian government.39 
 In confronting the enormity of the challenge to bring stability to the region, the 
United States government concluded that building a lasting peace in Bosnia  required 
not just an end to the war, but the construction of a multi-ethnic, democratic, and 
prosperous state.40  The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP or Dayton 
Peace Accords) provided the blueprint for how the three factions, with the help of the 
international community, intended to achieve this objective.  With their signatures, the 
former warring parties recognized the need for a comprehensive settlement to bring an 
end to the tragic conflict in the region and requested assistance in implementing the 
agreement from the United Nations, the multi-national military Implementation Force 
(IFOR), and other governmental and non-governmental organizations.41   
 Those aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords that relate specifically to 
democratization include the following commitments by all three parties: to resolve 
disputes among themselves through peaceful means; to respect human rights and the 
rights of refugees and displaced persons; to cooperate in the prosecution of war criminals; 
and to adopt a constitution establishing the Croat-Muslim Federation and the separate 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 160. 
40 Daalder, 144-5. 
41 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available [Online]: 
<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayframe.html.  [26 October 2000], 12. 
26 
Bosnian Serb Republic in a loose confederation.42  Members of the three-person 
Presidency as well as the national and regional legislatures would be elected 
democratically, with the first election to be held six to nine months after the signing of 
the document.  The parties also requested the assistance of the United Nations in 
coordinating civilian implementation of the Agreement and in constructing a 
professional, democratic police force.43 
Following the signing of the GFAP, US policy objectives in Bosnia were: 
[to] (1) provide a secure environment for the people of 
Bosnia; (2) create a unified, democratic Bosnia that 
respects the rule of law and internationally recognized 
human rights, including cooperating with the war crimes 
tribunal and bringing those charged with war crimes to 
trial; (3) ensure the rights of refugees and displaced persons 
to return to their prewar homes; and (4) rebuild the 
economy.44 
 
B. STRUCTURING INTERVENTION 
 As the international community prepared for intervention, there were two major 
debates that had to be resolved, both of which have had major implications for the ability 
                                                 
42 Under pressure from the United States to stop the 1993-4 war between Bosniacs and Bosnian 
Croats, the two sides had agreed to create the Croat-Muslim Federation in early 1994.  The alliance was 
always fragile, though, and on March 3, 2001, under the leadership of Ante Jelavic, the Croat member of 
the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croat National Assembly in Mostar announced its intention 
to begin self-rule in Bosnia.  Mr. Jelavic and three other Croat officials were removed from their offices by 
the High Representative, but insist that their plans for autonomy will be implemented on March 12.  
43 Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Available [Online]: 
<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bossumm.html. [26 October 2000], 1-5. 
44 United States General Accounting Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on European 
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.  Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward the 
Dayton Agreements Ultimate GoalsAn Update.  Statement of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, 
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of the intervening organizations to successfully carry out their missions.  The first was 
the question of who the civilian authority for implementation would be and what 
relationship would exist between that authority and other institutions, including the 
NATO troops charged with enforcing the military provisions of the agreement.  The 
second controversy was over how extensive the role of the military would be.   
 From the outset, the United States was determined that the United Nations would 
not play a role in implementing the GFAP.  There was considerable antipathy in the US 
Congress toward the UN and the relationship between the Clinton Administration and 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was deteriorating.  Furthermore, the United 
Nations had been discredited because of the debacle that was the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and also because of the role the UN and Yasushi Akashi 
had played in preventing the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs.  Consequently, 
the United States and its allies decided to designate their own civilian authority.45 
 The arrangement they decided on was to have a Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC) made up of representatives from key countries and international organizations 
oversee the effort and to appoint a senior civilian official known as the High 
Representative (HiRep) to do the day-to-day work. 46   Unfortunately, as it turned out, 
this position carried with it little authority:  The HiRep was appointed to coordinate 
                                                                                                                                                 
International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division.  
(Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1997), 2-3. 
45 Daalder, 154-5. 
46 Ibid.,. 156. 
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rather than direct the divergent and sometimes competing efforts of multiple international 
agencies and non-governmental organizations.47   
 The reason for this was simple:  When Robert Gallucci was writing the original 
draft of the civilian implementation annex to the Dayton Accords, he provided for a 
strong mandate for the HiRep, assuming that this position would be filled by an 
American.  However, during the negotiations, Americas European allies made it clear to 
Washington that if they were to be expected to provide most of the money for economic 
reconstruction, they also wanted the first HiRep to be a European.  At that point, 
Gallucci and the other American negotiators worked hard to limit the authority and 
responsibility of the High Representative.48 
 In particular, the HiRep was to be given no authority over military 
implementation because the US military absolutely refused to countenance any sort of 
institutionalized relationship between the implementation force and the HiRep.  
Holbrooke quotes Pauline Neville-Jones, Britains representative to the Contact Group, 
on the subject:   
This situation led US negotiators at Dayton to resist 
including in the implementation structure any sort of body 
which would provide a forum for the civilian administrator 
and military commander to discuss and find solutions to 
problems and issues which spanned their separate 
responsibilities.  Preventing interference should not be 
confused with promoting cooperation.49 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 153. 
48 Ibid., 157. 
49 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 276. 
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 Nor did the HiRep have any authority to enforce civilian implementation of the 
GFAP, a responsibility which, according to the agreement, had been left to the leaders of 
the former warring factions (FWFs).  However, as Ivo Daalderwho, as the Director for 
European Affairs on the National Security Council from 1995-96, was responsible for 
coordinating US policy for Bosniapoints out, all three factions had been more or less 
coerced into signing the Accordsthe Croats by Tudjman, the Serbs by Milosevic, and 
the Bosniacs by the United States.  Therefore, rather than fulfilling the agreement 
because doing so was in their self-interest, all three parties often chose to continue their 
conflict by means other than war: by obstructing efforts at implementation.50 
 This enforcement gap, as Daalder calls it, has been addressed to a degree.  As of 
the December, 1997 Peace Implementation Conference in Bonn, the HiRep may remove 
from office public officials who violate legal commitments and violate the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, andimpose laws as he sees fit if Bosnia and Herzegovinas legislative 
bodies fail to do so.51   
 Nevertheless, the failure to formally integrate the civilian and military 
implementation efforts or to provide the HiRep with a credible means of enforcing 
implementation has created a situation in which civilian-led stabilization efforts are 
proceeding slowly at best.  This means that the military may be required to take on more 
                                                 
50 Daalder, 160-1. 
51 Office of the High Representative: Information. Available [Online]: 
<http://www.ohr.int/info/info.htm. [20 December 2000], 4. 
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responsibility for non-military tasks than it would normally want to or than would 
necessarily be required of it in a different situation.   
 However, due to the outcome of yet another policy debate in Washington, this 
time between the Pentagon and Holbrooke, the military was only given the responsibility 
for accomplishing the military tasks in Dayton.  Like the question over the role of the 
civilian authority, this was another decision that had considerable implications for the 
future success of the implementation effort. 
 
 Holbrooke explains: 
There was no disagreement over the first two tasks of IFOR 
personnel: first, to use whatever force or other means was 
necessary to protect themselves; and, second, to separate 
the warring parties and enforce the cease-fire.   
 But aside from separating the forces and protecting 
themselves, what else should the peacekeepers do?  The 
disagreement on this critical issue between the 
maximalists, like myself, and the minimalists, mainly 
at the Pentagon, was profound.52 
 
 Drawing on their experiences in Vietnam and Somalia, Holbrooke believes that 
the military services had developed a preference for limited, clearly defined missions that 
they were free to carry out without any civilian interference.  In addition, Holbrooke says 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and NATO, anticipating a difficult security 
                                                 
52 Holbrooke, 216. 
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environment, believed that the first two tasks, force protection and implementation of the 
military provisions of the agreement, would require all their resources.53   
 Holbrooke, however, argued that the military should take on additional tasks such 
as keeping roads open, assisting in elections and arresting war criminals.  First, he 
thought that without substantive backing from IFOR, it would not be possible to carry out 
the civilian aspects of implementation; and second, he pointed out that the longer 
implementation took, the longer the military would have to stay in country anyway.54 
 Holbrooke complains that the Pentagon won most of the disagreements about how 
IFOR should be used, but he did eventually gain one compromise: If IFOR completed 
its required missions, it would have the authority but not the obligation to undertake 
additional tasks.55  That decision was to be made by the commander on the ground when 
the time came.   
 In the end, IFOR was given responsibility for ensuring force protection and 
freedom of movement (FOM); supervising the marking of boundaries and the Zone of 
Separation (ZOS) between the parties; monitoring, and, if necessary, enforcing, the 
withdrawal of forces behind the ZOS; and controlling airspace and movement of military 
traffic over key ground routes in Bosnia.  IFOR was also given the authority, but not the 
obligation, to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of non-military 
tasks; to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 216-9. 
54 Ibid., 218-9. 
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other organizations, especially the movement of those organizations; to ensure freedom 
of movement for civilians, refugees and IDPs and to respond to deliberate violence 
against such persons; and to assist in the monitoring of demining efforts.56   
 This thesis argues that, given the unique implementation structure arrived at in 
Dayton, the role for SFOR is critical to the successful completion of the mission in 
Bosnia.  In other words, because the military is really the only organized international 
entity in Bosnia and was initially the only one with any legal authority to take decisive 
action against uncooperative parties, it may be forced to take a more active role in 
stabilization so that normalization can occur.  Theoretically, civilian agencies could fill 
that void if the international community were to revisit the agreements arrived at in 
Dayton.  But because SFOR already has a broad mandate to support civilian 
implementation and any revision of Dayton is unlikely, an activist implementation 
strategy by SFOR offers the best chance for progress.   
C. TRANSFORMING THE CONFLICT 
 In any event, the first priority was to stop the fighting.  This is the primary 
objective of the transformation phase of a conflict suppression operation, and according 
to Joulwan and Shoemaker, involves seven basic tasks:  
• Separate warring parties 
• Maintain peace and security 
                                                                                                                                                 
55 Ibid., 222. 
56 The Role of IFOR in the Peace Process. Available [Online]: 
<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/iforrole.html. [26 October 2000], 1. 
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• Enforce arms embargoes 
• Disarm belligerents and assist in demobilization 
• Supervise compliance with arms control measures 
• Restore basic services 
• Provide humanitarian relief, including emergency assistance57 
 
The military aspects of Dayton, which NATO was in charge of, coincide roughly 
with the first four tasks in the transformation phase of conflict suppression.   
Both the GFAP and United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1031 
provide NATO with the authority to intervene militarily in Bosnia and delineated the 
mandate for the year-long Operation Joint Endeavor.  IFORs approximately 60,000 
troops, of whom a third were American, therefore deployed on December 20, 1995 with 
the agreement of the former warring factions (FWF) and the blessing of the United 
Nations.  By all accounts, they did their job admirably well. 
 Admiral Moore, briefing the US Senate Armed Services Committee on August 1, 
1996, said, Today is the 225th day of our deployment, and  our military missions are, 
for all intents and purposes, complete.58  The ZOS had been established 30 days after 
IFORs arrival (D plus 30); 15 days after that, the warring parties had vacated those 
areas; at D plus 90, the parties who were taking control of that territory had moved in; at 
                                                 
57 Joulwan and Shoemaker, 13-4. 
58 Senate Hearing 104-855 Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate 
One Hundred Fifth Congress Second Session August 1, October 2,3 1996.  U.S. Participation in Bosnia. 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 5. 
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D plus 120 confidence-building measures had been adopted, leading to the cantonment of 
heavy weapons, and IFOR was able to turn its attention to some of its secondary tasks.59   
Meanwhile, other governments and organizations were carrying out their 
responsibilities as befitted the transformation phase as well.  Because it plays a similar 
role in promoting European-wide security, the OSCE took the lead in negotiating arms 
control agreements and confidence-building measures with the FWFs in order to ensure 
regional stability and balance of forces.  Under the terms of the GFAP, the parties had 
agreed not to import arms for 90 days or heavy weapons for 180 days, and to begin 
discussing other measures with the OSCE.  By the end of the first year of implementation 
the US State Department had assessed that all three entities had complied with these 
aspects of the agreement.60   
Through bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental aid programs, the 
international community also restored basic services and provided humanitarian 
assistance to the people of Bosnia during this time.  In 1996, for example, the US donated 
$249 million for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts, much of which went 
to a Quick Impact package to help the Bosnian people as they prepared for the winter 
of 1996.   
This economic assistance, which was complemented by 
assistance from other donors, has made a significant 
difference in the life of Bosnias citizens.  Among the 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 6-9.  
60 Implementing the Dayton Agreement Year One: A Record of Achievement, Available 
[Online]:<http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosnia_accomplishments.html. [26 October 
2000], 1. 
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changes in Bosnia in 1996: 2,500 km of roads were 
upgraded, over 60 percent of the population was given 
power (up from 10 percent in December, 1995), over 90 
percent of the population was given potable water, about 80 
percent of pre-war telecommunications links were restored, 
and employment was up 30 percent with average wages up 
408 percent.  Nationwide, 15,000 homes were repaired, 5 
principle power generation facilities were repaired.  Urban 
transport was restored in major cities.  5,000 head of 
livestock and 1,000 tractors were imported to assist in 
agricultural recovery.61 
 
 The international community also assisted in physical reconstruction itself.  For 
example, although IFOR was emphatically not tasked with direct responsibility for 
civilian activities like rebuilding infrastructure, much of what IFOR did to support its 
own military mission also benefited civilians, and these efforts were coordinated with 
civilian agencies.  To date [August 1, 1996], IFOR has played a supporting part in 
nearly 3,000 civilian economic reconstruction projects, to include work on transportation, 
public works, and civilian infrastructure tasks.62 
D. MIRED IN STABILIZATION 
At this point, it can be said that the transformation phase of the operation was 
complete.  The military elements of the Dayton Agreement were implemented and the 
immediate needs of the people met.  The international community now turned its 
attention to creating the conditions that would allow for long-term stability: most 
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importantly, economic reform and democratization.  This is the goal of the stabilization 
phase. 
The stabilization phase of a conflict suppression operation is the one in which the 
focus shifts from military to civilian implementation, and during which the institutions of 
the indigenous government are readied to assume their future roles.63  It typically 
includes the following tasks: 
• Maintain internal stability 
• Establish the minimum level of military capacity essential for the 
countrys self-defense 
• Restart the economic base 
• Establish an indigenous police capacity 
• Re-establish the educational system 
• Build political institutions64 
 
1. IFOR/SFOR Contributions to Stabilization 
 As the mission in Bosnia transitioned to stabilization, the military continued its 
efforts to maintain security and also increased the support it provided to civilian 
organizations when it felt it could do so without detracting from its primary missions.  As 
Admiral Moore said, at D plus 225, IFOR was in phase four of Operation Joint 
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Endeavor, known as the peace implementation phase, where we attempt to create the 
conditions on the ground under which the civil implementation tasks can take place.65 
 For example, the Admiral said that IFOR had begun to increase its patrols in 
support of FOM, because FOM is critical to free and fair elections.66  IFOR dismantled 
checkpoints and worked out procedures for refugee return with the UNHCR and the 
International Police Task Force (IPTF) to promote peaceful movements of refugees and 
IDPs.67  Also, the improvements IFOR made to civilian infrastructure, such as roads, 
bridges and railways, enhanced both IFORs primary mission and civilian FOM.   
 Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter B. Slocombe explained some of the 
other steps IFOR was taking to complement and assist the civilian implementation effort: 
IFOR will, subject to its responsibility for all military tasks of Dayton and within its 
capabilities and force protection tasks, provide material and resource support to civilian 
agencies.  This assistance, including intellectual, staff, and coordination support, will be 
proactively pursued by IFOR.68   
 For example, in support of the September 1996 elections, IFOR increased its 
presence near polling stations to minimize the chances of disruption or intimidation, 
provided the OSCE with personnel and logistics support and assisted in printing and 
                                                 
65 Senate Hearing 104-855, 7. 
66 Ibid., 5 and 9. 
67 Ibid., 55 
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distributing voter lists and information materials.69  To the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), IFOR provided area security, threat 
assessments, communications support, accommodations, storage of ICTY-owned heavy 
digging equipment, and emergency assistance for Tribunal teams investigating war 
crimes in and around Srebrenica, Brcko, and other areas of Bosnia.70   
 After the September, 1996 elections in Bosnia, NATO leaders agreed that 
although IFOR had successfully completed its mission, much remained to be done in 
Bosnia and that a continued, albeit reduced, military presence would be necessary to 
consolidate the peace.  This follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) was composed of 
32,000 troops from 18 NATO nations and 15 non-NATO nations, including Russia.  Its 
name was indicative of its responsibilities: to deter or prevent a resumption of hostilities 
or new threats to peace, to promote a climate in which the peace process can continue 
to move forward and to provide selective support to civilian organizations within its 
capabilities.71 
2. Economic Reconstruction and Reform 
 Meanwhile, a wide range of civilian organizations assumed the burden of 
fulfilling the other tasks of the stabilization phase.  The World Bank, European Union 
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and International Monetary Fundwho together provided the bulk of the money for and 
administered an economic reconstruction and revitalization program that ended up being 
proportionately many times larger than the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe in the 
aftermath of World War IItook the lead in developing an economic society.72   
The center-piece of the effort was the four-year, $5.1 billion loan made by the 
World Bank for economic reconstruction.73  Longer-term goals focused on creating jobs, 
revitalizing the economyespecially through loans to small and medium-sized 
businesses and municipal level loansand reducing debt, all to make the advantages of 
living in a democratic society more readily apparent.74   
As of October, 2000, however, High Representative Walter Petritsch still assessed 
the program of economic reform to be falling short of its goal of creating a viable and 
self-sustaining economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The state of the economy was 
fragile, he said, and could very well worsen as the income from the World Bank loan 
dries up.  
So far, the privatization process has hardly attracted 
significant foreign interest and financial flows.  A key to 
medium term re-balancing of the economy is to foster 
private investment to replace external aid: by the end of 
2000, enough reforms must be completed to attract 
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investors in BiH in order to avoid a deepening financial 
crisis.75 
 
3. Political Reform 
 In the Dayton Peace Accords, the OSCE was asked to supervise the preparation 
and conduct of post-war elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus fulfilling the electoral 
requirement for democracy as well as developing some of the elements of a political 
society.  This included verifying that candidates running for office were in fact eligible to 
run for office, registering voters, auditing elections, providing training for the national 
and international staff that would be involved in running the elections, producing and 
disseminating voter information and also coordinating out-of-country voting.76 
 As a corollary to its political responsibilities, the OSCE also established a 
Department of Media Affairs (DMA) that strives to promote an independent, pluralistic 
and professional media in Bosnia and Herzegovina.77  It does this through financial 
grants and in-kind support to independent media organizations, by programs to assist in 
professional development and provide greater access to information, and by lobbying for 
laws relating to freedom of information and the protection of journalists.78 
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4. Rule of Law  
 Among the least successful elements of civilian implementation, so far, has been 
the work of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in promoting a secure 
environment for civilians by developing an indigenous police capacity, an essential 
element of judicial reforms to enhance the rule of law.  In Annex 11 of the General 
Framework Agreement, the parties requested the assistance of the UN in establishing a 
civilian law enforcement capability operating in accordance with internationally 
recognized standards and with respect for internationally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.79   
 In response, UNSCR 1035 authorized the creation of the IPTF to monitor, observe 
and inspect law enforcement activities and facilities; to advise and train local law 
enforcement personnel; to advise the new governments on effective civilian law 
enforcement; and to ensure that internationally accepted human rights and democratic 
policing practices are respected.80  Regrettably, in the event of non-compliance, the 
IPTFs only recourse was to appeal to the HiRep, who could then bring the matter to the 
attention of the FWFs.    
 Michael J. Dziedzic and Andrew Bair, authors of the chapter on Bosnia and the 
IPTF in the National Defense University Press book, Policing the New World Disorder: 
Peace Operations and Public Security, believe that the IPTF mandate left much to be 
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desired.  They quote the IPTFs first Deputy Commissioner, Robert Wasserman, on the 
subject:  
It appears the framers of Dayton perceived that the IPTF 
would somehow simply monitor local police to see they 
didnt get out of hand and then advise willing parties on 
how to professionalize the police with modern practices.  
There was no thought given to the fact that the ethnic 
rivalries meant there was no functioning police to protect 
minorities after Dayton.81   
 
 The inevitable result was that corruption and abuse of ethnic minorities continued 
in all three communities, and the police of the Bosnian Serb Republic did not even begin 
to cooperate with the IPTF restructuring program until late in 1997.  Consequently, 
Dziedzic and Bair conclude that due to the enforcement gap, in general, the IPTF was 
more successful at managing the behavior of local uniformed police forces than they 
were at controlling the conduct of vandals and provocateurs from both sides of the ethnic 
divide.82 
 Another essential element of rule of law, in addition to police reform, is respect 
for human rights. Both the United Nations and the OSCE have developed programs to 
monitor and promote the respect for human rights in Bosnia.  For example, the OSCE 
gathered information documenting discriminatory employment practices, including 
widespread firing of minority workers during and after the war, recruitment of workers 
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from majority ethnic groups, and hiring practices that give preference to ex-soldiers.  In 
response, officials developed a discrimination audit to monitor fair employment 
practices and coordinated with international investors, NGOs and embassies in Bosnia to 
impose conditionality in the allocation of funds, credits and loans.83 
5. Reconciliation 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which prosecutes 
war criminals, is another aspect of the effort to promote justice and the rule of law but it 
also helps to address the need of post-conflict societies for justice and reconciliation.  
Through mid-1997, the prosecution of war criminals proceeded only slowly.  At that 
time, although the Bosniacs had surrendered all individuals in their territory accused of 
war crimes, 66 of the 74 people publicly indicted remained at large, and some of them 
were serving in official positions.84   
 Today, 39 of 66 indictees are currently in proceedings and 27 have yet to be 
apprehended.  An additional 35 are in custody and 4 have been provisionally released 
(others have had charges dropped or died).  Nevertheless, two of the most notorious 
criminals, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are still free and of those who have been 
arrested, only a handful were turned in by the local police. 85  On the positive side, former 
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Bosnian Serb Republic President Biljana Plavsic, who served as the vice-president during 
the war, surrendered herself to the Hague in January, 2001. 
Encouraging refugee return can help fulfill the need for reconciliation as well, and 
the UNHCR was the logical choice to run the much-needed humanitarian aid and refugee 
programs, with the assistance of NGOs and private volunteer organizations.86  These 
groups had a daunting task ahead of them, as the war had forced 2.8 million people, or 
fully 60 percent of the pre-war population, from their homes as either IDPs or refugees.87     
 Since 1998, refugee return has increased significantly, despite an admittedly slow 
start.  The current figure for returnees is just over 700,000 registered returns for all of 
Bosnia Herzegovina from January, 1996 to October 31, 2000.88  This number does not 
include spontaneous returns, which according to the Office of the High Representative 
also have been increasing due to improved security conditions.89 
6. Programs by NGOs 
 Non-governmental organizations have been particularly active in assisting the 
UNHCR in refugee return.  For example, the United States Agency for International 
Development funds a local NGO called Centers for Civic Initiatives (CCI) that assists 
displaced persons in Jablanica to work together to reconstruct their communities.  The 
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group conducted a survey of other displaced Bosniacs to determine whether and under 
what conditions they would return to their former homes, and then met with local 
authorities and international organizations to find ways to meet those conditions.90   
 CCI is a good example of a project that meets an immediate requirement in a 
post-conflict society at the same time that it promotes social change.  It fulfills the short-
term needs of IDPs to return to their homes and simultaneously contributes to the long-
term development of civic culture.  CCIs goal is to train grassroots organizations to 
participate in the political process by organizing around issues that will improve the lives 
of their communities.91 
 Another USAID-funded NGO is the American Bar Associations Central and East 
European Law Initiative (CEELI), which responds to the need for an independent 
judiciary.  It provides money for four resident liaisons, short-term legal specialists and 
training workshops.  CEELI also worked with representatives of the Federation to rewrite 
the criminal code to strengthen due process protections and to bring to bring the 
Federation code into compliance with the international standards mandated by the BiH 
constitution.92 
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 The Soros Foundation also works to enhance the rule of law by helping law 
faculties to update their curricula, holding seminars and other training opportunities for 
lawyers and providing them with computers and Internet access.  It also funds a similar 
program for journalists to help develop an independent and professional media.93   
 On a less academic note, in May, 1999 the American Refugee Committee 
completed a $3.2 million Reintegration of Children and Youth into Society program, 
also bankrolled by USAID, that invested in playgrounds, fields and sports facilities and 
equipment throughout both the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.  One of the 
central objectives of this program was to facilitate the reintegration of communities 
through integrated recreation programs to foster youth participation and build a sense of 
community ownership for the repaired sites.94 
E. IN PURSUIT OF NORMALIZATION 
 But despite the considerable progress that has been made in Bosnia during the 
stabilization phase, a self-sustaining, democratic peace continues to elude both the 
International Community and the Bosnian people.  The goal of this section is to examine 
why, after six years, many billions of dollars, and the considerable efforts of SFOR, the 
UN, the OSCE, the World Bank and many other international, governmental and non-
governmental organizations, the normalization phase of the Bosnia operation has not 
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occurred.  Part of the reason, I will argue, is to be found in the assumptions that underlie 
the democratization effort itself. 
 In an ideal situation, once the international community judges that the situation is 
sufficiently advanced, the operation would then enter the normalization phase, during 
which external forces and assistance are gradually withdrawn and their responsibilities 
are turned over to evolving institutions within the country itself.95  Specific tasks 
include: 
• Gradually hand over internal security responsibilities to local police 
• Ensure that the judicial system is functioning 
• Withdraw international military forces while maintaining the capacity to 
keep the peace with forces outside the country 
• Gradually transfer responsibility for services to the local government 
• Assist in the expansion of the economic base 
• Make the transition to self-governance96 
 
 The situation in Bosnia, though, remains far from ideal and part of the explanation 
for that can be found in Carothers critique of the democratization template.  In 
explaining the core strategy of the US approach to democratization, Carothers suggests 
that there are four common mistakes American democracy aid providers tend to make.  
The first is over-applying the American model of democracy; the second is assuming all 
countries transitioning to democracy follow the same trajectory; and the third and fourth 
are rooted in the conceptual failings of the institutional model.  These are: first, that 
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building democratic institutions will result in democratization, an assumption that 
Carothers says leads to treating the symptoms rather than the causes of democratic 
deficits; and second, that democratic institutions can be grafted on to a society that is 
culturally and attitudinally not ready to support democracy.97  It is these last two 
misconceptions that lie at the root of some of the more fundamental shortcomings of the 
stabilization effort in Bosnia. 
 To be sure, there are other problems that have crippled civilian implementation of 
the Dayton Peace Accords as well, ranging, according to some, from the ethnic divisions 
enshrined in the Accords themselves to the absence of any mechanism to assure unity of 
effort between the civilian and military elements of the operation.  Other than 
acknowledging that there are many lessons to be learned from the international 
communitys experiences in Bosnia, however, this thesis does not intend to address or 
even identify all such issues.  The purpose of this thesis is only to understand how SFOR 
can help resolve some of the problems that prevent normalization.  This section proposes 
to identify those problems, while potential solutions will be presented in Chapter IV. 
1. Elite Commitment to Reform 
 The enforcement gap cited earlier, both at the level of the HiRep and the IPTF, is 
indicative of a failure on the part of the international community to take into account 
power structures and interests.  The international community is as guilty as Carothers 
hypothetical aid providers of assuming that local actors will adopt democratic goals 
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because democracy is inherently desirable, and then being surprised and disappointed 
when local people and groups refuse to change their ways, to work for the common good, 
or to give away power out of respect for principles.98 
Jeffrey Smith states the case rather bluntly in his December 4, 2000 article, The 
Struggle to Rebuild Bosnia for the Washington Post: A fundamental premisethat 
Bosnian leaders would govern fairly if given security and resourceshas proven 
woefully wrong.  Instead, they have often had one corrupting and nationally debilitating 
aim: to retain power at all costs, by expropriating state funds and stoking renewed ethnic 
nationalism.99 
 For example, despite the on-going activities of the World Bank, IMF, EU and 
other organizations involved in the economic reconstruction of Bosina, and despite the 
pressing need for economic reforms, Ivo Daalder and Michael B. Froman argue in a 1999 
article for Foreign Affairs that virtually no progress has been made in transitioning from a 
Communist to a market economy.   
Instead of lessening their grip on the countrys financial 
sector, privatizing its assets, and creating an atmosphere 
that encourages private-sector economic activity (including 
foreign investment), they have maintained control and 
tolerate, if not participate in, a system rife with 
corruptionall in the service of what they define to be 
their nationalist political interests.  For example, no real 
banking system has been permitted to develop because, to 
date, the Bosnians have insisted on maintaining the 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 102. 
99 Jeffrey Smith, The Struggle to Rebuild Bosnia: Five Years After the Wars End, the West 
Acknowledges that its Efforts Have Mostly Failed, The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 4 
December, 2001. 14. 
50 
Yugoslav payments system, which allows them to track 
every transaction in the country and to skim off the top to 
fund nationalist political activities.100 
 
 A second reason for noncompliance with civilian implementation programs, 
especially in the Bosnian Serb Republic, was the continued participation of indicted war 
criminals in politics.  The most egregious example of this was Karadzic, who wielded 
considerable power in the Bosnian Serb Republic even though the GFAP banned him 
from running for office.  Among other things, Karadzic instructed his special police to 
intimidate Bosnian Serbs who supported Dayton, and his use of the media to promote 
racist propaganda further undercut efforts at reconciliation.101 
  USGAO associate director Johnson recalled that, during our 1997 fieldwork in 
Bosnia, many officials with whom we spoke were unequivocal in their opinion that 
Radovan Karadzic must be arrested or otherwise removed from the scene in Bosnia as 
soon as possible.102 
 The international community did try to address noncompliance issues by 
withholding economic assistance as a means of compelling cooperation.  For example, on 
May 30, 1997, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council tied assistance 
for housing and local infrastructure of acceptance of returns, and gave priority to 
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UNHCRs Open Cities project.103  The State Department assessed this approach to be 
generating the desired political pressure for cooperation as early as March, 1997 because 
of signs that some Bosnian Serb politicians were willing to make concessions such as 
employing a multi-ethnic workforce in return for economic assistance.  Nevertheless, as 
of July 1997, officials had observed no tangible results in this area, primarily because 
attempts to work with these leaders were blocked by Radovan Karadzic.104   
 Clearly, Bosnias elites were not always the selfless, committed democratic 
reformers the international community had hoped they would be and they have 
successfully undermined much of the international communitys efforts to build 
democratic political and economic institutions in Bosnia.   
2. Failure to Internalize Democratic Culture 
 To be fair, however, neither are the corrupt, nationalist Bosnian politicians
regardless of which ethnic group they come fromrepresenting a local citizenry that has 
itself embraced democratic values and norms.  This problem highlights the second 
difficulty stemming from the institutional model of democratization: the lack of success 
the international community has had in developing the values and norms that provide the 
foundation for a functioning democracy.   
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 One indicator of this is the nearly ubiquitous presence of corruption and tax 
evasion:  
In Bosnia, multiple approvals by a wide array of petty 
officials are required for almost any type of economic 
activity, opening the door to widespread graft.  Taxes are 
collected unevenly. (It is believed that the nonpayment of 
taxes accounts for much of the oft-cited $1 billion lost to 
corruption).105 
 
This suggests that respect for the rule of law has hardly been internalized in Bosnian 
society, and that the reciprocal responsibilities of citizens to government and government 
to citizens are not observed.  Unless they are rooted in a civic culture that supports 
democracy, democratic institutions will not survive, not even in the mundane sense of 
being financially viable. 
 A second indicator that democracy has yet to take root among the citizenry is the 
fragile state of the civil society.  Civil society in the Western sense was not well 
developed under Communism, but it has grown considerably in size and importance since 
the war.  A Bosnian operations analyst at the World Bank office in Sarajevo who also 
serves as the World Bank liaison to NGOs in country said that due to the strong donor 
presence and large number of international NGOs, the number of local organizations had 
increased to over 300.  These organizations, he added, are becoming increasingly relevant 
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due to their comparative advantage in providing local services and are now recognized by 
the government as partners.106   
 Despite this marked progress, however, the local NGOs are not yet self-
sustaining.  The analyst cautioned that such organizations now find themselves at a 
crossroad: Either they will continue to build up their capacities and reputation and 
become more and more recognized [as a] factor in BH society, or they could remain 
heavily dependent on foreign aid and donations.107   
3. Lack of Legitimacy 
Yet another problem facing Bosnia is the failure of government to develop 
legitimacy as a democracy.  This is indicated both by the publics lack of faith in 
government institutions, but also by the high rate of emigration.  A member of the 
Oregon Army National Guard who established the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina commented that popular sentiment was very supportive of the 
international military presence; in fact, when entity police set up illegal checkpoints, for 
example, citizens called SFOR to complain.108  Such faith in SFOR is a credit to the 
force, but before the international community can consider its mission accomplished 
Bosnian citizens must have faith in the responsiveness and good intentions of their own 
law enforcement agencies as well.   
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 But rather than staying and trying to change the situation, many of Bosnias 
citizens seem to be opting to leave the country instead.  In his article for Foreign Affairs, 
former HiRep Carl Bildt quoted a UN survey that indicated 62 percent of young people 
would leave Bosnia if given the chance.109  The International Development Associate, a 
World Bank affliliate, tried to address this problem in part with a $1 million grant to 
purchase computers and make housing improvements at the University of Sarajevo to 
give high school graduates an incentive to stay in Bosnia.   
 As it happened, though, the universitys Board of Trustees, which included the 
prime minister and the presidents son, diverted over $500,000 during the course of the 
next three years for a fancy car, office furniture, supplements to salaries, and a low-
interest home loan for the Rector, Nezad Mulabegovic.110  Criminal charges have been 
filed in this case, but the widespread corruption has not given an already skepticaland 
often cynicalpopulation any reason to believe politicians on the whole are engaged in 
anything more than self-enrichment.111    
 Clearly, before peace in Bosnia can be considered self-sustaining, there will have 
to be a society-wide shift to embrace values such as the rule of law and democratic 
governance.  No meaningful progress can be made if the elites continue to thrive on 
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corruption and the people continue to emigrate and no one has confidence in Bosnian 
government institutions.  If these problems are to be successfully resolved, SFOR must 
redefine its mission to actively pursue social and cultural changes that support the 
national objective of the United States and the world community as a whole.   
 Thus far, SFOR has interpreted its role as one of merely providing a secure 
environment.  But as an Army Special Forces Colonel who now serves as chair for the 
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Department at the Naval Postgraduate School 
explains, Being a police force is nothing but providing a secure environment so that you 
can create change.112  Successful stabilization has to include effecting that change, and 
the military has an as-yet-untapped capability to play a productive role in this as well.  
The goal is not for the military to replace the civilian organizations in the International 
Community that are responsible for nation-building, but to have the military utilize all its 
resources in support of that goal.  The next chapter will discuss specific ways SFOR can 
do this, in particular by addressing the inadequate commitment to democracy among the 
citizens of Bosnia and pursuing military reform as a way to strengthen the legitimacy 





                                                 


























IV. EFFECTIVE DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
 The preceding chapters have described the end-state of a successful 
democratization mission and the contributions the military and other members of the 
international community have made.  Chapter III identified some of the shortcomings that 
continue to plague Bosnia and that prevent a large-scale withdrawal of troops and it 
explained the unique implementation structure that makes SFOR the best candidate for 
promoting effective change.  This chapter describes the ways SFOR can better support 
the overall mission.   
 As Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe told the Senate Committee on Armed 
Services during the October Hearing on Bosnia, IFOR succeeded brilliantly in 
accomplishing its military tasksin effecting the transformation phase of conflict 
suppression.113  Stabilization lags far behind, however, and even though this is properly 
the primary responsibility of civilian organizations, a strong military presence will be 
required until a significant degree of stabilization is achieved.   
 In many ways this situation is unique to Bosnia because of the poorly designed 
civilian implementation structure that failed to coordinate civilian implementation efforts 
and that left enforcement gaps at all levels of civilian implementation, from the Office 
of the High Representative down to the IPTF.  But the consequence is that SFOR will 
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have to be more of a force in driving stabilization for it to succeed.  More importantly, 
the military has the ability to support building a self-sustaining peace; choosing to assist 
would simultaneously contribute to the national policy objective by speeding the 
stabilization process and allowing SFOR to withdraw. 
 Chapter II explained the importance to consolidated democracy of faith in the 
legitimacy of democracy and of a political culture that incorporates democratic norms 
such as participatory citizenship, tolerance and willingness to compromise.  Chapter III 
highlighted the continuing absence of these elements in Bosnian society as a whole, 
despite the progress that has been made in other areas.  These are, however, three areas in 
which the military can expand its mission to more effectively support democratization: it 
can positively influence the behavior of elites; it can foster the development of attitudes 
better suited to democratic citizenship among the masses; and by pursuing military 
reform in the entity armed forces it can enhance the legitimacy of the government among 
its citizens.  The next three sections will examine how this might be done.  The fourth 
section will explore an alternative approach to force protection that would better support 
the international communitys objectives in Bosnia. 
A. INFLUENCING ELITE BEHAVIOR 
 A countrys elites make up the section of the population that provides the top 
decision-makers, political activists and opinion shapers, in politics, government, the 
economy and society. 114  A commitment on their part to democracy is therefore crucial 
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to its ultimate success.  Unless elites accept, in a regular and predictable way, the rules 
and limits of the constitutional system and the legitimacy of opposing actors who 
similarly commit themselves, democracy cannot work.115  A major stumbling block in 
the democratization of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, has been that the elites quite 
honestly are not committed to democracy. 
 The international community has been forced to admit that Bosnias nationalist 
leaders are more interested in retaining power and the economic benefits that come with 
it than they are in democratizing, even if this means exploiting the fear and pain of the 
people, as a senior NATO commander told New York Times columnist Thomas 
Friedman.116  Another problem is the continued connection between politics and 
organized crime, an association that is in many ways directly related to the war.117   
 The result, according to the SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure 
Environment with Respect to the Rule of Law, is an unholy alliance or iron triangle 
composed of organized crime figures, corrupt, nationalist politicians and the secret 
police, paramilitary and intelligence agencies.  This alliance dominates the political 
process and obstructs the implementation of Dayton and the successful 
institutionalization of rule of law.118  Critical elements of a democracy, such as a truly 
stable security environment, a market economy that operates according to legal principles 
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and an independent judicial system simply cannot emerge under the nationalist, 
undemocratic and corrupt leadership that is now in power throughout Bosnia. 
 The easy solution to this problem is to purge the leadership, and ideally this ought 
to have been done from the start.  US diplomat Jacques Klein, expressing frustration with 
the pace of implementation, observed: Our forefathers got it right after the Second 
World War when they imposed [on Germany] five years of occupation, de-Nazification 
and massive economic support.119   
 Admittedly, this is not a very democratic way to encourage democratization, and 
the situation in Bosnia now is radically different than it was in occupied Germany 50 
years ago.  In fact, the arrangement in Bosnia is deliberately anti-colonialist.  Rather 
than tell the Bosnians what to do in their own country, the idea has been to employ a 
hands-off strategy that some defend as the only way for local officials to learn how to 
govern fairly.120   
 Unfortunately, that strategy is not working because, as Carothers explains, the 
elites have a strong interest in maintaining the status quo.  The alternative, removing 
officials who oppose implementation, imposing laws when the local legislatures fail to 
act, pursuing war criminals and otherwise sidelining obstructionist leaders, may not be 
democratic either but it may work.  Germany, for example, emerged from a period of 
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occupation and authoritarian rule by the Allies to become a strong consolidated 
democracy.   
 The problem is, the Allied approach to Nazi Germany may not be possible in a 
negotiated settlement, as Pauline Baker, President of the Fund for Peace and professorial 
lecturer at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, writes in her chapter 
Conflict Resolution versus Democratic Governance in a book on conflict management.  
The need to create power-sharing arrangements with rival factions and to include all 
major groups in a peace process often clashes with the need to bring human rights 
abusers to justice, establish the rule of law, and build new state structures that can earn 
the confidence and trust of the people.121  The GFAP is one such example: The 
individuals who signed it were never sincere democratic leaders to begin with and they 
are now blocking the growth of truly self-sustaining peace.   
  There is, though, a way around this dilemma.  The solution is to interpret broadly 
the mandates that allow the international community to respond to obstructionism.  Both 
the Dayton Peace Accords and the 1997 decision by the PIC give the HiRep and SFOR 
the right to take action against individuals who are interfering with implementation.122  
Armed with this legal authority, neither the HiRep nor SFOR need feel any qualms about 
sidelining elites who are insufficiently committed to democratization. 
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 In pursuit of this end, there are a number of concrete steps SFOR can take.  First, 
it can vigorously pursue and arrest indicted war criminals.  Second, it can provide civilian 
organizations, particularly the Office of the High Representative, with intelligence on 
criminal activity and corruption.  And third, it can continue to deter the use of force or 
intimidation by maintaining a high profile around the country. 
1. War Criminals 
 The first solution, arresting indicted war criminals, is absolutely critical.  
Commentators ranging from Richard Holbrooke to Ivo Daalder to the authors of the 
SFOR lessons Learned cite the continued presence of war criminals, particularly Radovan 
Karadzic, as one of the most serious obstacles to implementation.  Ideally, because of the 
benefits to an intervening military force of being perceived as neutral and apolitical, some 
other organization would pursue war criminals, such as the IPTF, the ICTY itself, or 
eventually even the local police.  But the local police will not arrest their own leaders, the 
ICTY does not have the ability and the IPTF mandate is limited to training and advising.   
 SFOR, by contrast, has both the legal authority and the ability.  Annex 1A of the 
Dayton Peace Accords very specifically directs SFOR to  help create secure conditions 
for tasks associated with the peace settlement, which includes establishing an 
environment conducive to the rule of law.  It also explicitly gives SFOR the right to 
fulfill its supporting tasks, to accept further directives from the North Atlantic Council, 
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and to do all that the Commander judges necessary in fulfillment of its mission.  It also 
makes the Commander the final authority on military aspects of implementation.123   
 But although the NATO-led forces have the authority to arrest war criminals, they 
were initially reluctant to use it.  In fact, defining IFORs role in arresting war criminals 
was one of the most controversial issues surrounding its deployment.124  Military leaders 
objected to this mission for two reasons.  First, they remembered the backlash against 
American troops in Somalia when the hunt for Mohamed Farah Aideed began.   
 Second, they were uncertain what sort of reception they would get from the EAFs, 
paramilitaries, and civilians when they arrived in Bosnia and thought that enforcing the 
cease-fire and force protection would demand all their time and resources.  Eventually 
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both sides agreed to a compromise, which allowed that while IFOR would not have the 
obligation to arrest war criminals it would have the authority to do so.   
 Some even opposed that wording, though.  Meeting Admiral Leighton Smith in 
Sarajevo, Holbrooke says the military leaders made it clear to him that they intended to 
pursue a minimalist interpretation of their mandate, as they apparently already had 
informed the Bosnian public:  
Smith signaled this in his first extensive public statement to the 
Bosnian people, during a live call-in program on Pale Television
an odd choice for his first local media appearance. One of the 
questions I was asked was, Admiral, is it true that IFOR is going 
to arrest Serbs in the Serb suburbs of Sarejevo? I said, Absolutely 
not, I dont have the authority to arrest anybody [emphasis added 
by Holbrooke].125 
 
 A more nuanced interpretation of the mandate, however, was given by Under 
Secretary Slocombe, who understood the IFOR mission as being to detain indicted war 
criminals and hand them over to the International Tribunal if they are encountered by 
IFOR personnel during the normal course of their duties and the tactical situation 
permits.126   
 To its credit, IFOR did take steps short of arresting war criminals to curtail the 
political activities of prominent ultra-nationalists such as Karadzic.  Slocombe told the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services that  
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We have made a conscious decision, we being IFOR, to 
step up the pace of patrolling in the areas around Pale, 
which is where Karadzics operation has been run out of.  
This is not with any realistic expectation that we, IFOR, 
will catch him as a result of this. The patrolling is more 
to make it more difficult for him to take an active role in 
public life.127 
 
 Later SFOR did adopt a more aggressive approach.  The first instance of NATO 
troops attempting to arrest war criminals was on July 10, 1997, when British soldiers 
arrested one Bosnian Serb and shot another in self-defense.  The two Bosnian Serbs had 
been secretly indicted for complicity with commitment of genocide.128  But given the 
number and notoriety of the indicted war criminals yet to be arrested, more progress is 
needed on this front. 
 Nor is the pressure to take a harder line coming solely from people like 
Holbrooke.  The authors of the SFOR Lessons Learned also stress the importance of 
arresting war criminals.  They argue that the failure to arrest well-known Persons Indicted 
for War Crimes (PIFWCs) has eroded the credibility of SFOR in the eyes of the public as 
well as the criminals and corrupt political elements.  Leaders in civilian implementation 
have also pointed out that their ability to negotiate and leverage reform is tied to SFORs 
credibility, and that their authority is suffering, too.  Furthermore, despite the increased 
posture against PIFWCs, there are many indications that such people continue to 
exercise significant political influence and control behind the scenes.  Therefore, the 
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authors conclude, we could more easily dismantle the old anti-Dayton power structures, 
empower the new democratic institutions, and build a more sustainable peace if the most 
notorious PIFWCs were to be apprehended.129 
2. Targeting Crime and Corruption 
 In addition to arresting people accused of war crimes, the military can also make a 
substantial contribution to breaking the connection between organized crime and corrupt 
politicians.  This alliance possesses significant power in Bosnian politics and, among 
other things, actively prevents the establishment of institutions supporting the rule of law.  
It is able to do this because at present, corrupt, nationalist politicians, who get funding in 
part from organized crime, control the salaries and appointments of parliamentarians, 
judges, police and prosecutors.  These leaders have also been guilty of threatening those 
who would enforce the law against their interests.130   
 SFOR can do several things to minimize such problems.  It can continue to 
threaten to act in support of civilian organizations like the IPTF, which are also involved 
in combating crime and corruption.  It also ought to maintain or even increase its 
presence in places like courtrooms, polling stations, exhumations, IDP and refugee 
returns and evictions of illegal residents.131   
But the most important additional contribution SFOR can make in this regard is to 
use its unique intelligence gathering and analyzing capabilities to support efforts to target 
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organized crime.   The prime example of this is Operation WESTAR, a series of 
operations that attacked illicit intelligence and criminal activity in Stolac, a town in the 
Croat-controlled portion of Bosnia.132   
The operations were conducted over the course of several months, ending in 
October, 1999.  They were closely coordinated with civilian organizations such as the 
IPTF, entity police forces and the Office of the High Representative, which passed laws 
strengthening the prosecutors office and established a new court to take the fullest 
advantage of SFORs assistance.  The operations targeted the Renner Transportation 
Company, known to be a cover for transnational criminal activity and a source of violent 
resistance to Muslim resettlements in Stolac.  A subsequent operation also targeted illicit 
Croat intelligence activity in West Mostar and uncovered evidence of covert intelligence 
operations against the international community.133 
 Not only would an expansion of these activities in conjunction with civilian 
authorities help create a more democratically-minded political elite, but it could also have 
a secondary advantage.  One objection to using SFOR to arrest PIFWCs is that 
apprehending popular leaders could create a hostile environment.  Publicizing 
information about criminal activities these leaders were engaged in, such as 
misappropriating international funds, could mitigate any popular backlash. 134   
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A US Army captain who deployed to Bosnia for two six-month tours as a Joint 
Commission Observer, recalled that the local reaction had been very positive in one 
instance where an indicted war criminal had been arrested by SFOR.  They were like, 
good; he was a psycho; Im glad you caught him.135  The case was unusual, because the 
individual involved had a very negative reputation in his own community, but it 
nevertheless suggests a solution to the problem of increased force protection risks caused 
by arresting war criminals.   
 The authors of SFOR Lessons Learned do acknowledge that such activities may 
resemble police work more than they do traditional military operations, and, for that 
matter, police work that militaries in democratic countries are prohibited from becoming 
involved in.  But in Bosnia there is currently no alternative, and creating an alternative in 
the form of a professional police force dedicated to upholding democratic standards 
requires the removal of corrupt, nationalist politicians.  Furthermore, the work of 
targeting corruption and criminal activity in Bosnias elites would be done in the context 
of a finite mission directed at shaping the environment to support the development of rule 
of law.   
The aim is to marginalize and neutralize a relatively small 
number of hard-line leaders in order to open the political 
space for moderate political leaders and empower those 
aspiring to the openness and accountability of the rule of 
law.  Once this is accomplished, the environment should be 
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propitious for local public security officials to take 
responsibility for developing the rule of law.136 
 
 This creation of space for the emergence of moderate, democratic leaders, of 
course, was precisely the result that was achieved through discrediting of nationalist 
elites in Germany and Japan after World War II.137   
B. INFLUENCING THE MASSES 
But important as they are, elites are not likely to be able to govern effectively as 
democrats unless the masses embrace democracy.  This is why democratic civil society 
leaders in so many emerging democracies have placed such a high priority on civic 
education and mobilization efforts that seek to inculcate democratic values, knowledge 
and habits at the mass level.138  And the best way to do this, according to Diamond, is 
through practice: There is no better way of developing the values, skills, and 
commitments of democratic citizenship than through direct experience with democracy, 
no matter how imperfect it may be.139 
The values, skills and commitments that must be developed include, as discussed 
in Chapter II, participatory citizenship, tolerance, trust and willingness to compromise, 
among others.   There are two avenues open to SFOR whereby the military could help 
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support this.  One is more formal, and entails the conscious use of civil affairs and civic 
action programs to provide opportunities for democratic action.  The second involves 
recognizing that the thousands of democratic citizens serving in SFOR right now can play 
a valuable role in teaching intangible lessons of democratic citizenship simply through 
interacting with the local populace.140 
SFOR already possesses a considerable capacity for reconstructing and repairing 
infrastructure, and although a nation-building role was explicitly rejected in Bosnia, both 
IFOR and SFOR did rebuild such things as roads, transportation systems and public 
utilities that have benefited not only the military, but also international civilian 
organizations and the local people.  The military often coordinated these projects with 
civilian organizations participating in the implementation effort.  However, now that 
most infrastructure needs of the military and civilian organizations have been met, SFOR 
engineers and civil affairs personnel could continue doing similar projects but this time in 
conjunction with local governments as part of a consistent, overall strategy designed to 
enhance democratization. 
The benefits of such a program would be considerable.  First, civic action of this 
sort would strengthen local governments and enhance their legitimacy by giving them an 
opportunity to prove their usefulness.  Second, if a community could apply for assistance 
based on prioritized needs arrived at in a public forum, this would encourage a town or 
village to establish and utilize mechanisms for democratic governance, such as town 
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meetings.  Forums designed to elicit citizen input would, in turn, reinforce in the minds of 
the citizens the norms of democratic conduct built around compromise and consensus.  
Such projects could potentially also have a positive impact on reconciliation by offering 
opportunities for reintegrating society. 
Landrum Bolling, senior adviser to Mercy Corps International, recommended to 
NGOs that they include locals in some sort of advisory committee to consult on projects 
for similar reasons.  These committees would have very practical benefits, such as 
providing ideas and feedback, warning of potential problems or repercussions and serving 
as a communications link to the community.  Also, in and of itself, such a committee 
could have a positive influence on the community.  Working together in that kind of 
relationship can be a far more effective lesson in democracy and civil society 
responsibility than many lectures and seminars.141   
But opportunities for SFOR to promote democracy also exist through less formal 
structures.  One way would be by allowing troops serving in Bosnia to become involved 
in community service.  Chaplains could organize these activities, which could range from 
short-term projects such as repainting a school or planning a day when the community 
and the military got together to clean up litter along a river bank, to long-term 
investments in the local community, such as running an intramural sports program for 
area high school students or teaching English at an adult night school.  These are all types 
of services the military encourages its members to perform in their own communities, and 
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by continuing that tradition of volunteerism in Bosnian communities, soldiers would be 
exemplifying participatory citizenship, democratic leadership and a functioning civil 
society.     
The interaction does not even need to be this organized to be effective.  A Special 
Forces colonel now working as the Defense Attache Officer (DAO) at the US Embassy in 
Sarajevo suggested that by lifting the siege and allowing off-duty troops to go into 
town for food, relaxation and shopping, they could very well play a positive role in 
transmitting democratic values (in addition to providing troops with some relief from the 
boredom of being stuck on a military installation for six months).   
Bosnia is not a primitive culture that cannot understand 
modern concepts about governance and democracy.  But 
they must be articulated by someone other the the suits 
from the International Community who are seen as having 
a vested interest in the process.  Who better to represent the 
benefits of democracy and market economy than the young 
men and women in the US military?142 
 
Although the threat to force protection would increase, SFOR soldiers from other 
countries currently do this without incident.  And in the past, the United States has also 
chosen to abandon a policy of preventing its soldiers from mingling with locals in favor 
of policies that allow intermixing.  Stanley Sandler, in a history of US Army tactical civil 
affairs and military government, writes that although it was the American soldiers 
fondness for German women that forced the switch from a policy of non-fraternization 
                                                                                                                                                 
141 Riskin, 33-4. 
142 Steve Bucci, Re: Thesis Work. E-mail to the author,  3 February 2001. 
73 
to complete fraternization, the new policy had practical benefits for de-nazification as 
well.   
Mindful of the legacy of the Hitler Youth and worried about juvenile delinquency, 
the Office of Military Government of the United States for Germany (OMGUS) required 
all subordinate commands down to the company level to implement the German youth 
Activities (GYA) program.  By the summer of 1946, fully 25 percent of German youth 
were involved in the program, and Sandler says there were very few proven instances of 
German youngsters committing Nazi-inspired acts.143 
The combination of these two approaches, encouraging troops to volunteer in the 
communities and allowing them to interact informally with locals, could also have a 
positive impact on the problem of widespread emigration among Bosnian youths.  This 
exodus is troubling for several reasons.  First, it signals a lack of confidence in the 
government to provide a better future.  Second, it is indicative of a lack of confidence on 
the part of individuals in their own ability to make a difference. Finally, the large-scale 
emigration of educated young people bodes poorly for the ability of Bosnia to recruit 
qualified individuals for work in government and businesses in their home country.   
Tinjic, the Bosnian analyst at the World Bank, commented that reaching out to 
local youth should be a top priority for the international community.  The IC should also 
systematically seek for partnerships with local intellectuals and young people and 
contribute to making a better and more positive climate which would result in less young 
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people leaving the country.  This trend has been totally discouraging over the last couple 
of years.144  SFOR, being composed primarily of young people, may be particularly 
well positioned to do this. 
C. ENHANCING LEGITIMACY THROUGH MILITARY REFORM 
An added benefit of providing people at the grass-roots level with examples of 
democratic citizenship in action is that this is one of the ways to enhance the legitimacy 
of democracy.  But legitimacy, as explained in Chapter II, is also a product of regime 
performance in areas like the economy, its ability to maintain order, to effect social and 
political reform and the degree of respect for human rights paid by the judicial system, 
the police and the military.  A foreign military presence can make positive contributions 
to strengthen legitimacy through its interactions with these institutions, too.   
In this arena, police performance is normally the most critical, because the police 
are the representatives of government authority citizens are most likely to encounter on a 
regular basis.145  In Bosnia, because of the presence of the IPTF, mentoring and building 
legitimacy for local police may only tangentially be a military function, although in 
providing back-up and logistics support to the IPTF, SFOR contributes indirectly to the 
eventual success of this mission.   
In Bosnia, however, the relationship between the Bosnian people and their armed 
forces may be as important as the relationship between the people and the police for two 
reasons.  First, Bosnia is also in the middle of a transition from a Communist system, 
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under which the Yugoslav National Army, like the Interior Police (MUP) and the local 
police, was oriented toward regime survival.  The armed forces, therefore, were never 
viewed as a force for good in the country; they were always seen as an instrument of 
oppression.  Even more importantly, though, Bosnia is dealing with the aftermath of a 
very brutal civil war.  The people need to have confidence that peace will continue even 
without the presence of SFOR.   
Unfortunately this is not the case at the moment, because far from being a source 
of stability, the entity armed forces continue to be a cause for concern.  According to a 
United States Institute for Peace Special Report on Bosnia,  
The security environment in Bosnia today is artificially 
stable, because of the international military presence. 
Each of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia continues to 
maintain an army, which creates risks of renewed war as 
well as obstacles to self-sustaining peace.  These armies 
remain postured against one another.  All three forces 
maintain active intelligence gathering and order-of-battle 
doctrines to fight against one another.146 
 
The establishment of the OIG and the Standing Committee on Military Matters 
(SCMM), educational opportunities made available to senior officers, and SFORs 
involvement in issues of EAF restructuring are all ways SFOR is seeking to promote the 
development of a professional, democratic military in Bosnia.  But in this realm as well, 
more could be done.  Ultimately, the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina must be able to 
have confidence in the personal integrity, constitutional loyalty and military competence 
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of EAF [Entity Armed Forces] officers in general and specifically, the General Officer 
Corps.147   
Thus far, much of SFORs work has targeted senior officers, who like, their 
counterparts in the civilian world, frequently have the least incentive to embrace reform. 
Brigadier General Bargewell, SFOR ACOSOPS, suggested that focusing on mid-grade 
officers who are willing to change in order to join the EU would be more effective.148  
One way to do this would be by providing the EAF with joint training and exercise 
opportunities. 
Joint training and exercises conducted with SFOR troops could help EAF build 
the capacity for humanitarian and emergency relief missions, and reorient them from 
defending one ethnic group against the others to being a force for good in Bosnian 
society as a whole.  Engaging them in civic action projects would improve their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public, especially if SFOR could encourage them to cross 
ethnic boundary lines to do so.  For example, the Oregon National Guard colonel told a 
story of one of the Multi-National Division North (MND(N)) Joint Military Commission 
Chiefs who arranged to have some sandbags, donated by SFOR, transported by a Bosniac 
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corps commander to a Croat division commander in a region that was threatened by 
flooding.149   
The plans for Joint Task Force Haiti, which had the similar objective of creating 
an army respected for its ability to serve and protect Haitian society instead of one 
feared for its ability to terrorize that society at gunpoint out of the Forces Armees 
dHaiti (FADH), offer an example of how a coordinated campaign to professionalize the 
Bosnian EAFs might be carried out.150 
 The training for the FADH would have included an intensive program in areas 
like coastal and frontier security, disaster relief and search-and-rescue operations.  It 
would also have focused on areas like physical fitness, military appearance and 
deportment and the role of a soldier in a democracy.  Acting with Special Forces A 
Teams, the FADH also would have coordinated and executed small-scale humanitarian 
and civic-action projects.151 
 The logic behind the mission was that by convincing the FADH they would 
benefit from professionalizing, the FADH itself would become committed to 
professionalizing. 
Working and training side by side with professional role 
models of discipline, integrity, competence, toughness and 
dedication to duty, the Haitian soldiers could have learned 
to take pride in these virtues and to build their self-respect 
and public image upon them.  Once the FADH had 
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become interested in professionalizing itself, follow-on 
military training missions could have completed the 
task.152 
 
 In the long-term, however, using military advisors may be one of the best ways to 
instill meaningful reforms at all levels of service.  Acording to the colonel now serving as 
the Naval Postgraduate School SO/LIC chair, who was a military advisor from 1990-91 
in El Salvador, as long as the United States government is willing to take a long-term 
approach to solving the problem, military advisers can be a very effective catalyst for 
change. 
Frequently, advising includes helping the host nations armed forces to internalize 
the principles of democratic, professional military service.  The colonel describes this as 
a four-part process involving: setting the example; explaining why one chooses to do 
things that way; how this will benefit the host nation military as an institution; and 
finally, making sure that the same message is being transmitted at every level.  
Whatever values are reinforced at the top are the ones that remain when you leave, he 
said.153 
Being in a position to influence things like the behavior of troops on a daily basis, 
and understanding how that behavior affects the legitimacy of the government and 
military, is a unique ability properly trained military advisors bring to the table.  When 
youre on the ground living with the people you look at all aspects of a particular 
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operation or challenge  since were living there well look at the economic, social, 
political and cultural aspects of doing something.154   
 To be effective, however, any program of democratization and professionalization 
must be geared toward both the Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.  Eventually, 
the international community hopes to create a single state of two entities and three 
peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Currently, however, because the Bosnian Serb 
Republic is not cooperating fully with the Hague Tribunal, the Bosnian Serb Republic is 
not being fully engaged.  The Lautenberg Amendment that has been included in H.R. 
4811, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act since 1997 even mandates that reconstruction aid, with the exception of funding for 
humanitarian aid, democratization and certain cross border projects, not be given to 
municipalities that do not cooperate with the ICTY.155 
This thesis is not proposing that the international community not bring war 
criminals to justice, or that aid conditionality is not a legitimate technique for gaining 
cooperation.156  But when it comes to professionalizing the armed forces, initiating 
military projects to strengthen civil society and to communicate democratic values, there 
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is nothing to be gained by not also working with the Bosnian Serb Republic.  This means 
that if SFOR expands training and education opportunities for the entity armed forces and 
becomes involved in community projects, it should invite the Bosnian Serbs to participate 
as well.  The only way for Bosnia to achieve peaceful unification is to encourage each 
entitys simultaneous development.157 
D. FORCE PROTECTION 
There is another benefit to all these measures, in addition to the their usefulness in 
stabilization.  They would all enhance force protection as well.  The current American 
approach to force protection seems to be limited to reacting to the environment:  Because 
of the perceived risks, American troops in Bosnia travel in four-vehicle convoys, they 
wear body armor, and they are not allowed to go into town.  An alternative approach 
would be to shape the environment with respect to force protection, which would mean 
creating an atmosphere of stability, security and lawfulness rather than lawlessness.   
Seen from this perspective, arresting PIFWCs, supporting the fight against 
organized crime and corruption and participating in civic action programs may increase 
the short-term risk to troops, but reduces the risk in the long-term.  General John 
Sheehan, in a speech to the 1996 Aspen Institute Conference on conflict prevention, 
explained that in a pre-conflict scenario, protecting institutions and ideas such as a justice 
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system and human rights is force protection, because it protect[s] the forces of good that 
keep you from having to use me, and my forces, as a solution.158   
In a post-conflict scenario, such as Bosnia, force protection can also mean 
strengthening these forces of good by pursuing a strategy designed to enhance a 
countrys commitment to democracy and law and order.  Furthermore, those same civil 
affairs and civic action projects and interactions with the locals that can help mold 
democratic values in the name of mission accomplishment can also generate a more 
friendly attitude toward SFOR troops in the communities which reap the benefits of such 
initiatives.   
Colonel Mark Boyatt, the Army Special Operations Task Force Commander and 
Third Special Forces Group Commander during Operation Uphold Democracy, said that 
repairing and providing fuel for generators in Haiti was an example of a project that had 
positive consequences for force protection on two levels.  As a traditional measure, 
working generators allowed American troops to better protect them themselves by giving 
them light at night.  But because the electricity was also available to the townspeople, this 
project also served as a very visible demonstration of what we could do that in turn 
made the Special Forces A Teams a more welcome presence throughout Haiti.159   
By contrast, the current American approach to routine patrols in Bosnia is an 
example of an activity that has negative consequences for force protection.  Instead of 
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communicating confidence in the security environment, American patrols send precisely 
the opposite message to the public: 
When executing a rapid reaction mission in response to a 
reported incident, or action as a deterrent when such an 
incident is anticipated, full combat gear and focus is 
appropriate.  For routine patrolling today, it is not.  The 
effect of a squad of up-armored HUMMVs, with locked 
and loaded M2 50 cal MGs, and loaded-for-bear GIs just 
hanging around a village or road intersection is a chilling 
one.160 
 
Rather than giving locals a sense of security in which they can now be expected to 
go about their daily lives and begin the process of reconciliation, this image suggests that 
the current absence of violence is tenuous at best.  The American JCO in Bosnia 
confirmed this, explaining that, Americans especially turn everybody off. Theyll roll 
into a town or village and point their guns at everybody, which does not give people a 
warm and fuzzy.161  New units are particularly troublesome, he added, until two or three 
months into their six-month deployment cycle the tension level ratchets down and they 
realize no one is likely to hurt them.162   
There are several other potentially damaging side effects to this practice as well, 
though.  One is the dilemma of trying to encourage the adoption of non-violent conflict 
resolution techniques by using military units that are clearly anticipating violence.  As the 
SO/LIC chair put it, there is an inherent contradiction in showing up in flak jackets, ready 
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to use force, when youre supposed to be interacting with people and teaching them not 
to fight each other.163  The American DAO in Sarajevo also speculated that, with time, 
an intervening force that maintained such an incongruous profile could end up being 
viewed as an occupation force.164   
The authors of the SFOR Lessons Learned drew a different conclusion entirely: 
Some mistakenly perceived the US Forces mandatory protective gear and multiple 
vehicle convoys to mean that US Forces were more afraid of the locals.  This adversely 
affected how the local community viewed the US Forces strength and ability to protect 
the public.165   
In any event, the message being received is not one of peace and security.   
To correct this impression, the DAO recommends lowering the combat profile of 
routine patrols and increasing civil affairs, humanitarian activities, and JCO presence.166  
The JCOs live on the economy in strategic villages and patrol wide areas in civilian Sport 
Utility Vehicles, although the SUVs are identified as belonging to SFOR.  They are 
exempt from the four-vehicle convoy rule, and do not wear Kevlar.  Instead, they dress in 
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BDUs and carry side arms under their uniform shirts167.  They talk with the local 
leaders, merchants and men in the streets, not as interrogators, but as interested 
monitors.  They act as conduits of information and as sounding boards for ideas.168   
With Special Forces A-Teams filling these rolls, they are also the ideal people to 
send out in the community to get to know people, have political discussions, and teach 
informal lessons about democracy, the DAO said.169  Adopting this approach would 
normalize the security environmentthereby enhancing force protectionand 
simultaneously expand the opportunities for SFOR to serve as a role model for 
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This thesis demonstrates how SFOR can more effectively support democratization 
in Bosnia.  Chapter II described the desired end-state in terms of the theoretical elements 
needed for a consolidated democracy.  Joulwan and Shoemakers analysis of the conflict 
suppression process and Carothers portrayal of the democratization process provided 
useful frameworks within which to understand the international communitys 
intervention in Bosnia.  But the more important lessons to take away were from 
Diamond, Linz, Stepan and Huntington.   
It was these authors who explained what needs to be present in Bosnian society in 
order for a self-sustaining, democratic peace to be achieved.  Between them, they listed 
eight requirements:  free and fair elections, an autonomous political society, a lively civil 
society, respect for the rule of law, an economic society, a usable bureaucracy, a political 
culture supportive of democracy and a belief in the legitimacy of democracy.   
The purpose of Chapter III was to examine how and why the current situation in 
Bosnia falls short of the goal.  It described the very real progress that the Bosnian people 
have made toward a multi-ethnic, democratic state with the help of all the different 
organizations participating in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords.  But it 
also highlighted the work that remains to be done, and used Carothers critique of the 
American democratization template to explain why some of these problems persist.   
The conclusion of Chapter III was that the flaws inherent in the institutional 
model of democratizationa failure to anticipate the interests of elites in maintaining the 
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status quo and insufficient emphasis on fostering cultural attitudes needed to support 
democracyremain significant factors in Bosnia.  Moreover, because of the weak 
civilian implementation structure arrived at in Dayton, the only organization with the 
ability to adequately respond to these challenges is SFOR.  And thus far, SFOR has 
declined to fill this void. 
Consequently, those in power in Bosnia continue to obstruct genuine democratic 
reform in pursuit of their own interests.  Neither has the citizenry internalized some 
essential democratic principles like trust, a participatory ethic and reciprocal relations 
between citizens and the government.  Nor have government institutions such as the 
armed forces earned the confidence of the people they serve.  Taken together, these and 
other lingering problems prevent the state from functioning in a way that would earn it 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public.   
In short, despite the five years, billions of dollars and considerable manpower 
expended on behalf of Bosnia and Herzegovina, normalization is still a long way away.  
But the international community need not simply do more of the same in what would 
likely be an interminable and futile effort to impose democracy on Bosnias quarreling 
ethnic factions.  It can choose to pursue a more effective strategy of reform by learning 
from its experience.  Chapter IV explains what SFOR could do in support of such a 
strategy.  As the colonel in charge of the SO/LIC curriculum explained, Weve got a lot 
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of things we could do in DoD [Department of Defense] and lower, but someone needs to 
give the DoD permission.170   
Permission, or perhaps also the instruction.  There are, in fact, many steps the 
military could take to support the democratization effort that would compensate for the 
shortcomings of the current approach.  By pursuing war criminals, targeting criminal 
activity and maintaining its security presence, SFOR would be putting some muscle 
behind the international communitys plea that Bosnias politicians support 
democratization because it is the right thing to do.   
By becoming engaged with the Bosnian community through civil affairs, civic 
action programs, volunteer work and plain person-to-person interactions, SFOR could 
make some much-needed contributions to the reconstruction and reconciliation effort, 
while also providing an example of democratic citizens in action.  This would show 
people how to actively participate in democracy and what they can gain by doing so.  
Such a policy would also have positive consequences for SFOR, by shaping the 
environment with respect to force protection and strengthening the elements of society 
that decrease the risks to SFORs troops.   
 Lastly, through training programs, joint exercises and military advising, SFOR 
can help the Bosnian armed forces become the type of military that deserves the trust and 
confidence of the people it serves.  This would greatly enhance the legitimacy of the 
government and the military in the eyes of a population that currently has more reason to 
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fear its soldiers, and provide an example to the government and bureaucracy of an 
institution that is acting to serve the common good.   
 This strategy may look suspiciously like nation-building and should not be 
construed as the norm for military forces in every future intervention.  But because of the 
circumstances of the GFAP, SFOR has a unique role to play in Bosnia.  If the goal is to 
accomplish stabilization in Bosnia, this strategy has the advantage of being one that could 
actually succeed.  The DAO in Sarajevo phrased the argument this way: 
Right now, the military leaders of our nation (and much of 
our Congressional leadership) consider nation-building as 
anathema.  This is short-sighted and wrong-headed.  Now 
that stability is established, we need to shift gears and use 
one of the potentially most effective assets we have to bring 
about change in this country: the US military.  Does it 
prepare us for the next war?  The answer is debatable.  
Does it prevent the next war here, or the specter of an 


















                                                 
171 Bucci, e-mail. 
89 




1. Defense Technical Information Center ................................................................... 2 
8725 John J. Kingman Road, STE 0944 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 22060-6218 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library .............................................................................................. 2 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
 
3. Mr. Richard Hoffman.............................................................................................. 1 
Center for Civil-Military Relations 
1689 Cunningham Road Code CM 
Monterey, California 93943-5022 
 
4. Professor Anna Simons (CCSI) .............................................................................. 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
Monterey, California 93943-5101 
 
5.  Colonel Joe Andrade ............................................................................................... 4 
Naval Postgraduate School 
411 Dyer Road 
 Monterey, California 93943-5101 
 
6. Colonel Robert Tomasovic...................................................................................... 1 
Center for Civil-Military Relations 
1689 Cunningham Road Code CM 
 Monterey, California 93943-5022 
 
7. Colonel Steve Bucci ................................................................................................ 1 
 DAO US Embassy 
 American Embassy, Sarajevo 
 ALIPASINA 43 








8. Colonel Greg Kaufmann, USA ............................................................................... 1 
 Director, Balkans Task Force  
 Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 2400 Defense Pentagon Room 4B652  
 Washington, DC 20301-2400 
 
 
8. LT Allison Ritscher................................................................................................. 2 
 302 Washington Street 
 Marietta, Ohio 45750 
 
 
 
 
 
 
